Reference
An information integration theory of consciousness
Tononi (2004). An information integration theory of consciousness. BMC Neuroscience. https://doi.org/10.1186/1471-2202-5-42
| Type | journalArticle |
| Rights | rights-unknown |
| Tags | IIT 1.0 |
| Identifier | iit:ref/tononi-2004 |
Abstract
jats:titleAbstract</jats:title>jats:sec jats:titleBackground</jats:title> Consciousness poses two main problems. The first is understanding the conditions that determine to what extent a system has conscious experience. For instance, why is our consciousness generated by certain parts of our brain, such as the thalamocortical system, and not by other parts, such as the cerebellum? And why are we conscious during wakefulness and much less so during dreamless sleep? The second problem is understanding the conditions that determine what kind of consciousness a system has. For example, why do specific parts of the brain contribute specific qualities to our conscious experience, such as vision and audition? </jats:sec>jats:sec jats:titlePresentation of the hypothesis</jats:title> This paper presents a theory about what consciousness is and how it can be measured. According to the theory, consciousness corresponds to the capacity of a system to integrate information. This claim is motivated by two key phenomenological properties of consciousness: differentiation – the availability of a very large number of conscious experiences; and integration – the unity of each such experience. The theory states that the quantity of consciousness available to a system can be measured as the Φ value of a complex of elements. Φ is the amount of causally effective information that can be integrated across the informational weakest link of a subset of elements. A complex is a subset of elements with Φ>0 that is not part of a subset of higher Φ. The theory also claims that the quality of consciousness is determined by the informational relationships among the elements of a complex, which are specified by the values of effective information among them. Finally, each particular conscious experience is specified by the value, at any given time, of the variables medi