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Section map — Tononi & Boly 2025, "IIT: A Consciousness-First Approach to What Exists"

The primary non-mathematical source. Chapter in L. Melloni & U. Olcese (Eds.), The Scientific Study of Consciousness: Experimental and Theoretical Approaches, Springer-Nature (forthcoming). Zotero D2WCE7JG, key tononiboly2025. File: ../fulltext/J2IRJRJD__Tononi_Boly_2025_consciousness_first.md (4,447 lines).

This map is an index for citing and locating passages — never a substitute for reading. For any substantive question the chapter is read whole; the ranges below are for pinpointing a citation afterwards, or for a quick factual lookup where nothing hangs on the surrounding argument.

Lines Section Use it for
58–67 Summary The abstract in the authors' own words
68–108 Introduction: experience as intrinsic existence Why consciousness-first; the Schrödinger "play before empty benches"
109–288 Section-by-section outline Best source for a mini-summary of IIT — the authors' own précis of every theme
289–298 The foundations of IIT The three-step method (axioms → postulates → identity)
299–405 The five axioms Intrinsicality, information, integration, exclusion, composition — each with its conceivability argument; essential vs. accidental properties
406–498 The five postulates + principles Physical = cause-effect power; realism, being, becoming, minimal existence (→ MIP), maximal existence (→ maxima), finitism, atomism
499–666 Identifying complexes ii_s, φs, MIP, main complex, recursive condensation, fault lines, why posterior-central cortex, extrinsic entities, great divide of being
591, 615 Figures 2 and 3 captions Compact walkthroughs of applying the postulates to substrate aBC
668–737 Intrinsic units Macro units, macroing, update grains, meso hierarchies
749–809 Unfolding the cause-effect structure Distinctions (φd), purviews, congruence, relations (φr), faces, Φ-structure; bounds 2^n−1 and 2(2n−1)−1
811–883 The explanatory identity Quality is structure; Φ as quantity; Φ-folds; the three points to emphasize
885–1072 Empirical validation: presence Cortex vs. cerebellum, slow-wave sleep breakdown, PCI, exclusion and borders, prefrontal exclusion, split-brain, congruence
1074–1241 Space is extended Spots; reflexivity, inclusion, connection, fusion; grids; extensions; Song et al. contraction; pure presence; the philosophical blind spot
1245–1323 Time flows Moments, directedness, directed grids, flows, static present, postdiction
1325–1453 Objects Concepts + configurations + features; hierarchy; the letter 'A'; intrinsic agnosia; blindsight
1455–1560 Narrow qualia (color!) Cliques, kernels, color-opponent minicolumns, why hues resist introspection — the direct theory backing of the Color project
1562–1610 Compound contents Pain as a compound Φ-fold
1612–1656 Meaning is intrinsic "The meaning is the feeling"; the dream of the friend's face
1658–1794 Perception as interpretation Connectedness, triggering coefficient, perceptual structure; construction vs. reference
1701–1741 Box 1: Shannon vs. integrated information The six-point contrast; information as message vs. meaning; communicating meaning
1796–1941 Matching Perceptual differentiation, matching, neurophysiological differentiation, interpretive/generative power, shaping
1811–1843 Box 2: Meaning in a box The challenge to computational-functionalism, posed sharply
1943–2043 Richness of experience Combinatorics (2-unit → 14 ibits; 1024-unit → ~1010307); against sparse-experience claims; phenomenal vs. functional vision
2045–2126 Introspection and pinging Posterior lattice vs. prefrontal switchboard; introspection as pinging
2128–2246 Intrinsic powers ontology Vs. substrate and emergentist ontologies; existence is not constitution; supervenience vs. supersedence
2248–2316 The great divide of being Intrinsic vs. extrinsic entities; ontological dust; the sleeping body
2318–2381 Being is not happening / not doing Structure vs. process; against functionalism
2383–2517 Intrinsic meanings vs. extrinsic referents Universals, Sherlock Holmes, inter-subjectivity; LLMs (φs = 0, virtual units, relaxed requirements, extrinsic meaning)
2519–2619 Actual causation Realization, α, 𝒜-structures, causal processes, causal plasticity; causation is not prediction
2621–2832 Free will Forks in the mind not in the road; only what exists can cause; responsibility; self-changing actions; indeterminism for existence not freedom
2833–2893 Empirical tests of free will; problems and solutions Readiness-potential reinterpreted; genuine questions and answers
2895–3043 Patients and infants PCI, disorders of consciousness, development
3045–3115 Other species Bees, connectomes, extrapolating Φ
3117–3249 Machines and organoids Von Neumann computers functionally but not phenomenally equivalent (Findlay 2024); double dissociation of consciousness and intelligence; organoids
3251–3422 Instructive criticisms Searle (observer-dependent information), functionalism labels, the unfolding argument, Aaronson's grids, emergence/dualism, panpsychism
3424–3499 Place in nature The four displacements and their reversal
3501–4058 References
4059–4447 Endnotes i–lii Substantive clarifications keyed to superscripts in the text — often the precise answer to a technical question

How to use this for objections

The chapter's own "Instructive criticisms" section (3251–3422) is the model for how the expert answers objections: state the objection accurately, then give IIT's reply from within the theory, usually diagnosing the misreading as an unexamined extrinsic/functionalist presupposition. Do not import outside commentary; the replies are here.