# Reasonable criteria for functionalists; scarce criteria from phenomenological perspective

Haun & Tsuchiya (2021). *Reasonable criteria for functionalists; scarce criteria from phenomenological perspective*. Cognitive Neuroscience. <https://doi.org/10.1080/17588928.2020.1838473>

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| Type | journalArticle |
| Rights | rights-unknown |
| Tags | Critique responses |
| Identifier | `iit:ref/haun-2020` |

## Abstract

In their article, Doerig et al suggest a set of criteria for evaluating theories of consciousness. Naturally, their criteria are situated in their own particular perspective on consciousness science, which we have critiqued in the past. Their first criterion is likely to be the one that is most productive and least contentious: if the field can agree to a family of paradigm cases for consciousness, this would be an important endeavor for the field.